PERSPECTIVE
Edward E. Masters, Former U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia
by Ed McWilliams and John M. Miller*
Former U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia Edward E. Masters died on March 21. The senior diplomat will be remembered as the U.S. official who did more than any other to shape the U.S. relationship with Indonesia. His ties to the country extend back to 1964 when he was named Political Counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta. He served as U.S. Ambassador in Jakarta from 1977 to 1981. While his official relationship with Indonesia ended in 1981, Masters was a key player in shaping U.S. policy towards Indonesia thereafter, notably since1994 when he founded the U.S.-Indonesia Society (USINDO), a powerful lobbying organization which functioned as flack for the Suharto dictatorship and promoter of the U.S. corporate interests which lavishly funded the organization.
Masters was present at the creation of the three decade U.S. partnership with the Suharto dictatorship which entailed the U.S. providing critical military, financial and diplomatic support for the regime's repression of its own people, as well as the 1975 invasion and occupation of neighboring East Timor (now Timor-Leste). For the U.S., the unspoken terms of that partnership obliged Washington to ignore Suharto's extraordinary brutality. Suharto's seizure and consolidation of power cost the lives of hundreds of thousands of Indonesians. The U.S. Embassy culpability in the slaughter was direct. The U.S. provided lists of Suharto opponents, liberals and purported "communists" to the Suharto regime, a fact that Masters, a senior Embassy official at the time, at one point acknowledged but subsequently denied.
John Saltford in "UN Involvement with the Act of Self Determination in West Irian 1968 to 1969" writes that Masters, then working at the U.S. State Department. told a British diplomat in June 1969, "that Washington saw little merit in getting involved in the 'niceties of ascertainment,'[of West Papuan wishes concerning their political status] which might lose them good will in Jakarta to no advantage."
Masters culpability in the horror that overtook East Timor following the Indonesian invasion and occupation was substantial. The invasion was launched on the heels of a visit to Jakarta by then President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger, who green-lighted the operation which was in final stages of preparation during their visit. Masters became ambassador shortly thereafter in 1977 and played a key role in Indonesia's bloody consolidation of its occupation. As Ambassador, Masters was a central player in drawing up the U.S. diplomatic strategy which defended the Suharto regime from U.S. public and international opprobrium after the invasion. The U.S. position was made especially awkward insofar as it contradicted the position of Portugal, the former colonial power in East Timor, and a U.S. NATO ally.
Masters was key to U.S. administration efforts to deflect U.S. Congressional and media criticism of the Suharto regime over the invasion and famine which stalked the people of East Timor as a direct consequence of Indonesian occupation. He disputed well-established estimates of up to 200,000 Timorese deaths during the Indonesian consolidation, contending that the death toll was "only" about 30,000.
In early September 1978, Masters traveled to East Timor with nine other foreign ambassadors to view the Indonesia's "approach to the East Timor problem." Following the visit, Masters claimed that the Indonesia had reduced its military presence, refugees were taken care of, and movement was unrestricted. He added that Suharto and Indonesia were committed to the economic development of the "province."
U.S. support for Suharto's illegal occupation of East Timor was tangible. The U.S. provided the Indonesian military with the weaponry needed to consolidate control. U.S. provided OV-10 Broncos counter-insurgency aircraft devastated the civilian population driving them from their mountain hideouts into Indonesian camps. Broncos were also used in West Papua where Indonesia's U.S.-backed annexation in 1969 was facing strong resistance from poorly armed but determined Papuan freedom fighters. The death toll there among civilians was unknown but was substantial.
Masters uncritical support for the Suharto regime in some ways was to play an even more important role in the 1990's. In December 1991, Suharto's military assaulted a peaceful march by Timorese students at the Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili, the capital of occupied East Timor. Hundreds were killed or wounded. Western journalists on the scene, though beaten by Indonesian soldiers, were able to report the "Santa Cruz massacre" to a horrified community.
In response, the U.S. Congress, groups like ETAN, and the public demanded a cessation of military support for Suharto's military. Some training was quickly restricted. In 1994, Masters formed USINDO which worked closely with major U.S. corporations and key players within the U.S. Government to try to rebuild the U.S. partnership with Suharto. The corporate-endowed USINDO lavished funds on travel to Indonesia by Congressional staff who were feted and provided carefully choreographed visits intended to cast the dictatorship in a positive light. The group also worked assiduously to court the U.S. media. In the 1990s, USINDO success was limited. Under congressional and other pressure, the U.S. continued to restrict security assistance and the East Asia financial crisis fatally undermined Suharto's rule.
In 1999, following the popular overthrow of the Suharto regime, the East Timorese voted for independence in a UN organized referendum. The Indonesia's scorched earth campaign after the vote resulted in a complete suspension of U.S. support for the Indonesian military. The assistance has only gradually been restored, thanks in large measure to persistent lobbying by USINDO.
Throughout the Cold War, the U.S. partnered with many dictators, who postured as allies in a struggle purportedly in pursuit of democratic freedoms. This hypocrisy was never more apparent than in Indonesia. The U.S. backing of Suharto became especially difficult to defend in the post-cold war period when the realpolitik cold war exigencies no longer obtained.
But for Ambassador Masters, who publicly rejected "confrontation" with Suharto and his military over human rights concerns and democratic progress, the defense of U.S. corporate interests in Indonesia was always paramount. His legacy is a painful and shameful one which continues to burden U.S. relations with a now democratizing Indonesia.
* Ed McWilliams is a former foreign service officer and editor of the West Papua Report and John M. Miller is National Coordinator of the East Timor and Indonesia Action Network (ETAN)
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